The U.S. government pressured allies to withdraw support from a conference examining American influence operations. Canada obliged, although our officials are still attending. I'm glad they stayed. I'm disappointed we pulled our sponsorship. I understand the political machinations, but how are we supposed to assess foreign interference if the country being examined gets a say in whether we support the discussion? That in itself is foreign influence. EU DisinfoLab's Disinfo2026 conference, held in Vilnius on October 7–8, included a panel titled “USA as a FIMI threat: acknowledge, adapt, push back.” The organisers publicly announced the programme in September. American influence was already on the agenda. Reuters reported that the State Department pressed allied governments to distance themselves from the event. Canada and Lithuania stepped back, while France maintained its support. Washington argued that describing the United States as a disinformation threat undermined shared goals. Unfortunately Global Affairs Canada cited changes to the framing of panel discussions as a reason to pull sponsorship. However, Canadian officials continued to participate after the sponsorship withdrawal. Governments can disagree with a conference panel. Supporting independent research does not require endorsing every conclusion reached on stage. Canada could have made that clear and kept its support. What we should be assessing FIMI stands for foreign information manipulation and interference. The European External Action Service describes intentional, co-ordinated, manipulative behaviour that threatens political processes and other public values. It can involve governments or non-state actors, and includes disinformation. The framework examines the conduct behind an influence effort as well as its content. Someone in the United States criticising Canadian policy is entitled to an opinion. A government openly presenting its position is conducting diplomacy. A covert network pretending to be local citizens to manipulate public debate needs a different response. We need evidence of who is involved and what they are doing. Being an 'ally' should have no bearing on whether that evidence gets examined. Especially when it comes to the U.S. and the open comments from the White House. American operations should be discussed In June 2024, Reuters exposed a secret Pentagon campaign using fake accounts impersonating Filipinos to undermine confidence in Chinese vaccines and pandemic assistance. It began under Trump, continued into Biden's presidency and was stopped in 2021. A senior defence official acknowledged the propaganda effort. The U.S. military had deceived people abroad about who was speaking to them in order to influence their views. We already have a documented example of American state-directed manipulation of foreign audiences. Nobody needs to build this argument around Trump's latest posts. It's there in the open. U.S. focus on Greenland warrants scrutiny too. In August 2025, Denmark summoned the senior U.S. diplomat after Danish broadcaster DR reported alleged covert influence activities by Americans connected to Trump. ABC News described efforts to cultivate contacts and gather material that could damage perceptions of Denmark. Danish intelligence separately warned of influence campaigns aimed at dividing Greenland and Denmark. DR could not establish whether those individuals acted on instructions. We should retain that uncertainty when discussing the allegations. We should also respect Greenlanders' right to decide their future and their legitimate grievances about Denmark. Investigating whether outsiders are exploiting those grievances through deception is part of protecting that right. These cases give other countries grounds to assess the United States as a serious FIMI risk. To grounded and fair each operation still needs to be examined on its own evidence, with attribution explained rather than assumed. Canada has an office for this Just recently Musk urged Quebec, Alberta and Saskatchewan to separate; the Prairie premiers rejected his suggestion. His remarks do not establish a covert operation or government direction. But his platform and strong ties to the White House (albeit off and on) and his influence muddy the water. This leads to me still wanting to know how outside support for Canadian separatism is being organised and whether any of it involves arrangements Canadians should know about. Especially if directed from a Washington branch. We have an office responsible for making those arrangements more transparent. Anton Boegman is Canada's Foreign Influence Transparency Commissioner. His independent office administers the foreign influence registry and enforces its registration requirements. The office has contacted the Alberta Prosperity Project, which met with U.S. State Department officials. According to an October 6 Globe and Mail report, reproduced in a news excerpt, the group's chief executive, Mitch Sylvestre, said an email arrived on September 18 requesting a response by October 3. He said it was discovered in the 'junk folder' on October 6. Nice one. The group's lawyer replied, denying that it had an arrangement to act on behalf of a foreign principal - They may want to chat with Rath and get their stories straight. Or is there more to it. The commissioner's September 22 public statement confirmed outreach to people and organisations that might have reporting obligations related to the Alberta referendum. It also warned that failure to comply could lead to enforcement measures, including administrative monetary penalties. I don't know about you but I'm waiting with baited breath. Canadians deserve to hear what follows. The office should publish regular updates on compliance work and explain how it checks whether registration is required. When enforcement decisions can be disclosed, we should see them. If its mandate leaves gaps, it should explain those to Parliament so legislators can decide whether to change the law. I want to see more action from this Commission. Boegman has said past meetings held before the registry took effect on August 4 are outside its requirements. If that's the case then we absolutely need to amend his requirements and scope. His public statement also makes clear that earlier arrangements remaining active can require registration. A completed meeting and a continuing arrangement cannot simply be treated as the same thing. There is broader work underway: the Globe report quoted CSIS saying federal security agencies were working with provincial partners to safeguard the referendum. I am not suggesting an email is the entirety of Canada's response. I am asking for enough public information to understand that response and judge whether it is adequate. So far it's not, in my opinion. Nobody expects intelligence agencies to publish operational details. But the government can explain who is responsible, what protections are in place and what Canadians should do when they encounter suspected manipulation. Where the commissioner cannot act, ministers should explain how the wider response covers the gap. Contacting a group about its obligations is useful. Following through, and letting the public see what can reasonably be disclosed, is how the office earns confidence. Ottawa should defend the scrutiny The pressure on Disinfo2026 is a separate concern. Diplomatic lobbying alone does not prove disinformation, but Washington used its influence to discourage allied support for a forum examining American conduct. I see that as an attempt to make scrutiny politically more costly. The conference continued. Canada stayed involved. Yet withdrawing sponsorship still tells researchers something about the support they can expect when their work irritates a powerful ally. France kept its support. Canada could have done the same. Again, I'm disappointed and a little frustrated. I understand why Ottawa might want to avoid another dispute with Washington. We have plenty already. But independent research into interference is a poor place to concede, especially while we are asking Canadians to trust our own efforts to expose foreign influence. Our constitutional future belongs to the people who live here, with Indigenous rights and treaty obligations fully respected. We need to be able to examine attempts to manipulate that future, including attempts involving Americans. What I want Canada to do Apply the same standards to U.S. information operations that we apply to those originating elsewhere, like China and Russia. Identify the actors when the evidence supports it, explain what remains uncertain and give independent researchers the support to pursue uncomfortable findings. The commissioner's office should make its compliance work more visible. The federal government should explain how that work fits with the responsibilities of CSIS, the RCMP and Global Affairs Canada. Canadians should be able to understand where to report concerns and what happens to those reports. We have responsibilities as readers and participants in social media too. Before sharing a claim, check who is behind it and what reaction it is trying to provoke. Look for repetition across accounts, compare the claim with verifiable information and decide whether it deserves your attention or your audience. Apply those questions to this article. American researchers and journalists are among the people exposing these operations. They deserve support when their own government objects to their work. If Washington disputes the evidence presented in Vilnius, it can answer it. Canada should support the freedom to ask the questions and make its own findings visible enough for Canadians to assess. I would like our government to be as willing to defend that scrutiny as Washington has been to discourage it. --- Jason Butterfield is a Canadian sci-fi author, veteran, technology leader, and developer of Byline.pub. His fiction explores…